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This publieation of "Seienee and Wisdom" is the very leeture notes
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the earlier Searchings version. Marcel's handwritten eorreetions of Mauriee
eranston's translation have beenlntegrated Into the following text. Also,
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the sake of grammatieal clarity and/or amplifying philosophieal content,
Mareel's important oral additions to the printed lecture notes as recorded on
the CSC tape have been ineluded within brackets. Where Marcel in his oral
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text, the substitution is noted as [substituted: -].
There are many people who deserve to be aeknowledged for their
assistanee with this publieation of "Scienee and Wisdom." Sr. Majorie Smith,
eSJ, of the esc library archives was most torthcoming with her time and
extremely helpful in providing the materials pertaining to Mareel's visit in
March 1965. Professor Howard Hong and Cynthia Lund of SI. Olaf College
also eommunieated valuable background information on Mauriee Cranston
and Mareel's presentation of "Seience and Wisdom" at SI. Olaf. K.R. Hanley
was very generous In supplying a copy of her essay in The Heights and a
recollection of Marcel's time at LeMoyne. Finally, Jean-Marie Mareei,
Gabriel's son and executor of the Presence de Gabriel Mareel in Paris, has
our sineerest gratitude for graeiously authorizing this publication of "Selenee
and Wisdom."
I think I shall be understood better if I begin by defining the
terms of the problem I am going to diseuss this evening, a subjeet to
whieh I have given the very general title, Seienee and Wisdom.
In the world of today • a world so obviously eontrolled by
seienee, or, more preeisely, by the infiriitely various and ever·
expanding teehniques that make up seienee • what meaning ean ane
still give to the word "wisdom"? What we shall be eoneerned with is
that change in people's attitude to life whieh is the result of the
hegemony of seienee and its teehniques. This is another way of
saying that our problem is of an existential or phenomenologieal kind.
It is a matter, above all, of knowing whether wisdom itself is not in
danger of degenerating into a collection of technical procedures and
in doing so of losing that supreme value ascribed to it by the moralists
of the past.
If, however, I have preferred not to be more speeific in the title,
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not to eall my subjeet, for example, "Seienee and Wisdom in the World
of Today", it is beeause it has seemed to me impossible notto refer, at
any rate up to a eertain point, to the history of thought. Assuredly,
there eould be no question, within the limits of a single lecture, of
covering the whole history- of the problem. In prineiple, it is elear that
one ought to go right back to the history of ancient thought, beyond
the Epieureans and the Stoies, to Plato. But I shall limit myself to
seeking historical bearings in the thought of the seventeenth
century, and partieularly in that of Deseartes, and then to showing how
the problem developed in the eighteenth century and after, with the
coming of Romantieism, on the one hand, and the success of
evolutionary ideas on the other.
In the prefaee to the Freneh edition of Deseartes' Principles 01
Philosophy, there are important passages which charaeterise very weil
some aspeets, at any rate, of Cartesian thought: I quote: "The word
'philosophy' means the study of wisdom; and by 'wisdom' one means
not merely prudenee in the affairs of 'the world, but a perfect
knowledge of all those things that a man should know, as much for the
conduct of his life as for the preservation of his health and the
invention .of all arts." Descartes adds that this knowledge must be
deduced from first eauses; and he indieates the means by whieh one
aequires that "wisdom we eustomarily have" (whether a notion whieh
is clear and distinct in itself, or the result of some experience, or of
eonversation with other men, or of reading books written by authors
qualified to give us good instruction). It is in the same preface that we
find the famous remark: "The whole of philosophy is Ii~e a tree, of
which the roots are metaphysics, the trunk physics, and the branehes
the other scienees, which may be redueed to three main ones,
namely, medieine, mechanics and ethics • that is to say, the highest
and most perfect ethics, which, presupposing an entire knowledge of
the other sciences, is the ultimate degree of wisdom". (Pleiade
Edition, p. 428).
What is remarkable in these passages is the range that
Deseartes gives to the word "wisdom": one is almost tempted to say
that wisdom is here co-extensive with knowledge. It seems to be
taken for granted that whoever progresses in knowledge raises
hirnself at the same time in what we might call the moral domain.
Nevertheless it would be useful to introduce a limitation at this point.
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For Descartes is really far from identifying the intellect with the will.
The will is, in itself, infinite; human understanding is definitely not; and
it is this disparity which sets up the possibility of error and in particular
of moral error.
My friend and colleague, Henri Gouhier, one of the leading
Descartes scholars, has drawn my attention to a letter written • not to
Mersenne as is stated in the Pleiade edition, but to Father Mesland,
and dated February 9, 1645. Descartes speaks here of the freedorn
of indetermination. "I have never denied", he says, "that this positive
faeulty exists in 'the will, far from it; I believe that we meet it, [notably] in
those those kinds of actions, where the will is not carried by a strong
pressure of any motive towards one direction rather than another; but
that it is also revealed in all other kinds of actions; so that the will is only
ever determined by that faculty that brings it into use, so much so that,
at the very moment when a compelling reason carries us towards one
thing, though, morally speaking, it might be difficult for us to do the
contrary, yet, speaking absolutely, we could do the contrary, for it is
always open to us to stop ourselves from doing what is clearly known
to be good, or to stop ourselves assenting to a manifest truth, so long
as we believe it is a good thing to bear witness by such means to the
freedom of the will". These were Descartes' words.
In the case of Spinoza, on the other hand, we are confronted
by a radical intellectualism: the will and the intellect are one and the
same thing. Here the idea of the Sage assumes at once a simplicity
and a perfeet coherence. The Sage is the man who has liberated
hirnself from the snares of the imagination and from the yoke of the
passions. But this liberation is itself effected by the exercise of the
intellect. "In so far as the mind understands all 'things as necessary, in
that same measure it enlarges its power over the passions and frees
itself from their yoke". (Ethics, Book V, prop. 6). But it is very obvious
that the Spinozistic thought is not to be placed in what we should
nowadays call a psychological perspective. ,cHe who understands
himself clearly and distinctly, and also his own passions, loves God,
and he does so the more fully as that understanding is the greater".
(prop. 15).
But we know weil enough that, for Spinoza, that third kind of
knowledge which belongs to the Sage, in other words, to the fully
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liberated mind, is a knowledge which must be distinguished from the
second kind of knowledge, which never goes beyond the level of
abstractions and generalities. It would be rash to say that for Spinoza
the Sage and the Scientist are strictly identical. The word "scientist" is
in danger of leading us astray here, since we may doubt that Spinoza
used the word in the sense that we give it today. On the other hand,
Spinoza did without any doubt recognize that simple beings - by
which 1mean those lacking in scientific knowledge in the strict sense
of the term, that such beings might, nevertheless, acquire, if not the
third kind of knowledge, at least its equivalent and the true love of
God.
All this, of course, raises difficult problems of interpretation. We
know weil enough how many controversies have risen over the
interpretation of Spinoza. Even so, provided it is understood that one
is simplifying somewhat the data of very complex realities, we may
rightly regard Spinoza as the leader of a procession of Rationalist
philosophers, who afterwards, and still today - even though their
number is undoubtedly diminishing - assert without hesitation that
progress in knowledge [that is to say, in science] necessarily entails
progress in Wisdom. This confidence is especially manifest ·in the
Aufklärung, the Enlightenment, although even again certain
qualifications must be introduced in the ease of the really first rate
thinkers. At all events, we can say that in this tradition of thinking, the
crucial notion is that of association [and sometimes of identity]
between the intellect and the will.
But in the Eighteenth Century, probably in the wake of
Fanalon, and eertainly among the English, and, needless to say, in
the ease of Rousseau, there emerged an altogether new conception
of the moral sense and affeetivity, one which was more and more
opposed to Cartesian intellectualism. It seems moreover that the
notion of wisdom tended to suffer at the same time a eertain
devaluation. In the case of Goethe, the very fact of his Spinozistic
sympathies preserved for wisdom its preponderance, though he sees
it as the mark of something rather strictly aristocratic; on the other
hand, with the Romantics [especially the German Romanties, but also
perhaps the English, like Coleridge] wisdom, it seems to me,
underwent a sort of dissociation: we can distinguish on the one hand,
rules of prudence, regarded with a certain disdain, governing the
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conduct of life, rules which are dependent on the simple
understanding, on the igenium; on the other hand, the Romanties
recognized, in order to exalt, a wisdom above wisdom, derived from
intuition, or, in any ease, from faculties not reducible to the
understanding or discursive knowledge. A certain convergence
might also be discerned between these romantic views and the purely
Christian conception of a sacred wisdom which is madness in the eyes
of seeular wisdom [substitute: understanding].
In every way, wisdom, in so far as it does not reduce itself to
mere sagacious counsel, tends to appear as something wholly
irredueible to knowledge - if not to knowledge in general, at any rate to
the knowledge which is expressed in empirical scienee. In fact it
seems that the more the sciences tend towards specialization, the
harder it becomes to find a link between them and that kind of intuitive
knowledge, a knowledge which is perhaps in same ways elose to Art,
the art of living, which still deserves the venerable name of wisdom.
Things emerge rather as if each particular science, taken alone,
tended to barricade itself against the temptation feit by every layman
to encroach on human existence - and here I take the word
"existenee" in its contemporary meaning, whether it entails explieit
normative evaluations or not.
[A gQod example might be drawn here from medicine. Still at
the end of the nineteenth century and in the first years of this century,
a doctor, a medical man, was usually considered as a man whose
adviee even outside the body state (physieal condition) could be
valuable. One feit that the doctor had a certain survey of life which
enabled hirn to be wise. But so far as medicine has split into
specializations, this is no more the case. One would not usually think
that a cardiologist, for instance, a specialist of the heart or another
organ, kidney's if you like, would be entitled·to give wise adviee as to
the conduct of life. This of course may happen, but what I mean is that
connection between medical knowledge and wisdom which still
existed 50 years ago, now exists no Ionger. And this, I think, is an
important fact.]
To look at another side of the picture, the suecess of
evolutionistic theories tended to accredit what was otherwise ealled
wisdom to a biological concept, namely, the idea of the adaptation of
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man - man considered essentially as a living, rather than a thinking
being, in the milieu in which he enacts his role. Now this is the
schematized expression of much more complex data. For the
evolutionist philosophers, of course, tried to incorporate in their
theories, with varying degrees of success, cerlain elements taken
from earlier doctrines.
On the other hand, it goes without saying that some thinkers
among them - say, for example, Nietzsehe, from one side, and
Bergson, from the other - expounded a philosophy of life infinitely
[substitute: incomparably] richer than that of their predecessors.
From the moment that life is conceived as creation, it becomes a
question for Man to participate actively in that very creation, if only
because the milieu he lives in is no longer considered as a fixed
datum, but as something itself susceptible of being renewed and
transformed. But this does not happen without bringing a radical
change in the idea of wisdom itself. In the case of Nietzsehe, we must
of course pay great regard to the specific period of his thinking, which
underwent such marked variations: we must, above all, distinguish
two phases. First the,re is Nietzsche's criticism of attitudes or styles of
evaluation, which continues - and at the same time enriches with new
and profoundly original elements - the tradition of the French moralists
from La Rochefoucauld to Chamfort. Secondly, and above all from
Zarathustra onwards, there is something like the submersion of the
critical element by a prophetie vision centered on the eternal cycle
and the coming of the superman. I admit I am not sure that, in the
process, Nietzschels thought does not venture into regions which go
far beyond what has been traditionally understood by the name of
wisdom.
With Bergson, assuredly, things developed differently. But
what is equally true in his ease, is what being inspired, after a eertain
moment, by a religious reality that is nowhere apparent in his earlier
writings, his thought seems to be on the point of greatly transcending
that of the traditional moralists. [Here one ought to go into details
especially about his distinction between closed and open morality.]
After these summary - these almost scandalously summary -
historical observations, it is time for me to come to the problem I spoke
of at the outset. As I said. it is from an essentially phenomenological
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point of view that I intend to approach my subject.
In the first place, it seems to me that we need to listen carefully
and detect the sound, the tone, that the word Ilwisdomil has for the
ma,jority of our contemporaries, and, naturally, I am thinking especially
of the young. Briefly, we have to treat it like the sound of a musical
instrument of which the quality, the timbre, is in question. One must
frankly admit, I believe, that very name IIwisdomli arouses, first of all,
suspicion. And why? Because it seems to imply a priority being given
to experience and even, in a way, to age. It is a word that savours 01
the old. And this sort of priority is quite rightly challenged, indeed
denied. First because the old are, as a whole, held responsible for
the tragic, perhaps desperate, situation in which the world finds itself
today. [And, for the wars which we have known.]
Perhaps those who feel like this might express themselves in
these words: IIlf what you call wisdomll, they might say, IIhas played a
role in the march of events, one can only say, in that case, it has been
no better than the worst folly. Alternatively, i1 you claim that the world
has developed as it has, in spite of the counsels of wisdom, one can
only say that such wisdom has been ineffectual and non-existent.
What is more, it has allowed a certain number of privileged persons to
give themselves a feeling of moral comfort which seems to us today,
very suspect. 11
Nor is this all. It will probably be noticed that wisdom, in all the
forms that we know, seems [almost] invariably to imply a sort of
acquiescence in the existing order of the world, or the sociat system;
to imply, at any rate, a resignation: and, in this sense, wisdom runs the
risk of being the accomplice of the worst conservatism.
These remarks all point to the same conclusion: one is led to
say that wisdom is in da,nger of having nothing but a fallen and
discredited existence [in the present world].
But can one not reply to such objections that they rest on a
conception of wisdom that is far too narrow: and that the problem is
precisely one of getting beyond these limitations, and finding the
necessary conditions for doing so? But no doubt the rejoinder will be
that it is both too easy and too dangerous to give the same name to
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mental attitudes that are very different, if not actually opposed to one
another.
However, before we ve,nture any farther in that direction, it will
be useful to contront, more directly than I have so far done, the central
question of the relation between science and wisdom.
Now, the use of the word l'scienceN requires special
precautions just as the word ·wisdomll does.
If there is a region when Blondel's distinction between 'thinking
thought' and Ithought thought' has a bearing, it is certainly that of
science. One might say, I believe, that the function of 'the scientist as
a scientist is to keep constantly to the level of 'thinking thought', while
the scientitic popularizer moves only on the level of 'thought thoughtl
[that is to say, of thought already digested], or of empirical findings
that he tends too often to raise to an absolute status by taking them
out of the context to which they belong. A highly qualified young
scientist with whom I was talking a few years ago, suggested to me
that the layman is far from suspecting the part that approximation has
played, even in the discovery of natural laws that are no longer
questioned. Itls commonly assumed, he said, that a scientific
experiment can be reproduced as often as you like. In fact, we notice
very often that this reproduction leaves much to be desired, as if, so
to speak, the experiment contained a sort of dross, for it could only
rarely be freed. Now this remark bears witness to a kind of perception
that we never find among people who treat the results of empirical
science as absolute.
If 1insist here, it is to recall that the real scientist is always on his
guard against the scientific popularizer [substitute: vulgarization], and,
against the temptation to define human conduct, for example, in
terms of a theory of evolution passing off as a definitive discovery of
truth. In this connection, 1notice that one has no difficulty in finding
today in France, or Germany, and no doubt elsewhere, scholars who
bring out the limitations of existing theories of evolution, and what is
speculative or hazardous in many statements of them: here I might
mention, for example, the remarkable biologist Louis Bounoure,
professor at the University of Strasbourg.
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But what has all this to do, you might ask, with our subjeet?
Weil, that the seientist, as a seientist, as a man engaged in research,
gives good proof of wisdom in regard to those hasty and unreflective
eonelusions that men outside draw from his work. Let us take eare to
define the nature of this wisdom. It is essentially a eautiousness whieh
would never express itself in the name of an objeetive eertitude, like a
eertain kind of old-fashioned theology or dogmatie Marxism _. but
whieh expresses itself rather in the name of those exigeneies to whieh
scientifie research must itself submit if it is to be authentie research.
It would be obviously altogether absurd to aeeuse such wisdom
or prudenee, of being likely to dirn a eertain flame. This kind of
eondemnation, whieh stems from a sort of romantieism of knowledge,
is indefensible, and eould not stand up to any mature refleetion.
It seems from what we have so far eonsidered that seienee,
regarded as Ithinking thoughtl earries in itself something whieh is really
of the order of wisdom. But, Important as it may be, that eonelusion
does not appear to have earried us mueh further. It is of no great
interest, you will say, that the seientist, as a seientist, is distinguishable
from what mlght be ealled the eounterfelters of selence.
What, after all, does interest us, is Man. Should one say, Man in
general? Now, this Is a way of speaklng that 1have always objeeted to
land even rejected]. Let us say rather that Man is each one of us,
seen existentially, that is to say, seen in the path that is given him to
follow from birth to death. Vet it is obvious 'that this image of a path - if
it eorresponds in a way to the strueture of the Being-Man, is, on the
other hand, inadequate; for simply by reason of the fact that the path
ean be severed at any Instant by death, the traveller that I am may see
in death less a final term than apressure, a eonstant imminenee. Now,
the word IImay" is very significant here, for Man is not compelled to
aeknowledge this manifest pressure • and the problem then presents
itself to hirn as one of knowing whether he is wise or not to aetualize
that possibility. This question does seem to eall attention very
preeisely to what has always been known as wisdom, and one eannot
see how it ean be evaded - or rather to evade it is already in a way to
resolve it. Can seience, one might ask, be of any help to us here?
Weil, in any ease, [this seience] eould only be psyehology. But has
psyehology, taken as a seience, in itself what is needed to answer a
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question, or even to understand its whole bearing? Of course, we all
know the theory much favoured by the Americans according to which
the very fact of thinking about death, except to take precautions to
delay it, is considered morbid. The notion which comes in at this point
- and it is closely tied to what I have already discussed - is that of
nadjustment". Incidentally, itls interesting to notice here the surprising
degradation in the Americanized world of the spinozistic idea that the
sage does not think about death. But in reality what has happened is
that Ithe sagel has been replaced by Ithe healthy manl, the adapted or
adjusteq man who tries to get the most out of life.
Itls a matter, on the one hand, of getting the normal
satisfactions of life (as much in the realm of comfort and sport as of
sexual relationships); but it is also a matter of assuming easily onels
place in society; and, from this point of view, there is room, of course,
for affection and generosity. The adjective 'decent', more current no
doubt in England than the United States, is probably the one that
best fits this conception - about which one can say that it tends to put
what has always been regard~d as wisdom at its lowest limit. Why
.Iowest, you may ask? Weil, because it seems to exclude everything of
the nature of creation and, moreover, what is perhaps more serious,
of interrogation - of that personal and anxious interrogation, without
which many of us Europeans would feel that a man is not, strictly
speaking, a man. Those who hold to that minimal conception of
wisdom will go to a psychoanalyst when they notice in themselves
difficulties of adjustment, just as one goes to a specialist in the
digestive organs if one suffers from indigestion or constipation. It is
highly significant that such an analogy must be invoked in this
connection. The important thing is the idea, implicit or not, that what
used to be called the spiritual life must now be regarded as a simple
functioning that ought to follow certain rules, like the lungs, the heart
and the liver.
These remarks have the utmost importance for our subject.
But it is a matter of knowing exactly whether Science itself is
responsible for this devaluation, or whether it is a philosophy that
speaks in the name of Science if without authority. Certainly Anglo-
Saxon positivism claims that there is an unbroken continuity between
science and the kind of philosophy that resists metaphysics, resists all
Welt- or Lebensanschauung. Our previous remarks were orientated
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rather differently, but this will become clearer in what folIows. If I
started out with the question of death, and the connection between
death and the subject itself, that is because nothing else, perhaps,
clarifies so weil the opposition we are seeking to determine. All thi~
might be developed in a variety of ways. A few years before the last
war Andre Malraux told me that once, when he was in Moscow, where
he was struck by the scientific optimism of his hosts, he pointed to a
newspaper report of some tram or railway accident, and observed that
for all the social progress that might be achieved, the tragedy of death
would always exist - (Perhaps this was a kind of obscure premonitionl
Malraux's second wife was to die during the second war in an accident
of this kind [and two sons of his died in a car accident]). However,
they replied to hirn in Moscow that in the future the trams and the
railways would work so perfectly that such accidents would be
avoided. The ~stonishing blockheadedness of such an answer
surpasses any comment. Nevertheless it is very significant. Death is
here regarded as anormal cessation of a functioning which happens
normally when the apparatus has completed its term. It is no more
tragic tor a man than tor the apparatus or machine in question. [And,
they would add,] it is only a morbid mind that would raise itself against
what is, once more, quite normal. Here again, we can see very clearly
the common denominator between Soviet thinking and [a certa.in]
American thinking: both tend towards a purely technocratic outlook.
One might go·on from this to point out a ciose analogy with the
idea of love, which also runs the risk of degradation in the same
perspective. Here, as before, the danger is of what might be called an
indefinite deflation of human reality. We shall be able to distinguish in
what is commonly called love, only the instinct of procreation on the
one side, and on the other certain satisfactions that must be regulated
in such a manner as to spare the individual any disequilibrium liable to
disturb the exercise of his social duties.
Still, the question remains. Are we here in the presence of
something which follows logically from the nature of Science? One
ought to be more precise at this point, and bring in the idea of a
scientific anthropology. But it is obvious that a fundamental question
is implied by all this: and that is the question of value - judgement
itself.
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I was very struck to notice in the United States that the
philosophers of the Logical Positivist schoal are inclined for the most
part to assert that all value judgements are in reality no more than
expressions of personal preference; which comes, in effect, to saying
that such judgements have a deceptive, or traudulent, character. To
adopt a position of this kind is, in fact, to reduce wisdom to a personal
rule of living that cannat be universalized. One comes out in the end
with a sort of moral dietectics. But again one might observe that even
a diet implies the idea of health: and it is just that idea which is put in
question here.
However, if we remember what has been said earlier, we shall
not fail to ask ourselves whether a science that is more conscious of • I
shall not say merely its limits, but the very immanent conditions of its
being - whether such a science would not have [to display] a humility
that is of the order of genuine wisdom. Let us try and make this more
concrete.
Why, first of all, do I put such stress on humility? Because
scientific progress, if it is seen as a whole and with all its technical
developments, does seem to offer a permanent inducement to the
most excessive pride. In this connexion, it is difficult to attach too
much importance to the exploits of the astronauts and to those
scientists whose calculations have made their exploits possible.
Never before has the eritis sicut Dii of the Scriptures found so striking
an application. But can we rebut the idea, formulated with such
exceedingly great force by the ancients, that pride [substitute: hubris]
makes men mad?
We can at any rate confront an objection. Suppose it remains
true, that in the ease of one individual, pride leads to a disturbance of
the mind, does this necessarily remain true of humanity taken as a
whole? We might put the question differently: if we see clearly the
individualls responsibility (in regard to society, or even in regard to
humanity as a whole), does this word have a meaning tor humanity
generally? Naturally I put the question outside the framework of
theology, since the responsibility of Man before God retains all its
meaning for those who argue from Christian premisses. But here we
have to set aside this example, since the idea of wisdom [as we have
considered it] seems to be, in principle, [rightly or not] a secular one.
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I have spoken of humanity as a whole. But to reflect is to realise
that this global way of talking does not correspond to any reality. First,
it is by means of a crude fiction that we can think of humanity as a
totality. There is also something contradictory in it - for met who forms
apart of humanity, to put it in front of me as total whole. It would be
more useful to come down to brass tacks. What do we really envisage
today? Are we to speak of a body or college of international scientists .
being invested by the mass of living man with unlimited power? If this
were so, it would be the scientists who would have reason to proud.
But the idea of such a mandate is entirely fictitious. Another thing -
and it is something much more serious - we could not possibly
dissociate the scientists from the governments which give them the
necessary means to those ends which scientists themselves are not
always ready to appreciate, by reason of that confusion which always
arises between genuine designs and the principles invoked. So what
conclusion does this lead to for our present subject? It is that in
incriminating science here, we run a grave risk of placing the
responsibility where it does not lie.
And yet, a deeply disturbing question arises at this point -
notably one concerning the state of mind of the scientist who sees
that his discoveries are used for ends that he himself condemns and
'that he considers harmful for humanity. Can we be satisfied with the
convenient solution which consists in distinguishing the scientist from
the man? This comes down to saying that the scientist, as a scientist,
has no concern with consequences; while the man hirnself feels
obliged to take them into consideration. It seems to me that Einstein,
for example, would have refused to lend himself to this kind of
dissociation. When he protested, with such heart-felt vehemence,
against the military use of atomic energy, he certainly had no feeling of
having set aside in any way his role of scientist.
It seems to me that what emerges here is that we are all
concerned with the idea of truth. No doubt, one must find amiddie
term between utilitarianism, or the pragmatism that subordinates what
we call truth to certain practical ends, on the one hand, and, on the
other, a kind of idolatry of truth 'that makes it a sort of Moloch to which
everything must be sacrificed, even, if necessary, the human race.
Even so, I believe that we have gathered something as we have
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progressed - I do not say the elements of a solution, but some
indications, more or less, that help us to see· in which direction we
should set ourselves. Remember what was said about the
considered mistrust of the true scientist towards the simplifications
that satisfy the popularizer. What is at the heart of such thinking is a
research for which the scientist has always to clarify more precisely the
immanent conditions, so that the problem of method remains
perpetually present. But research as such does not allow one to
hypostasize: a negative, but crucial advantage. It does not allow one
to separate research from the man who conducts the research, and so
revert to the anthropology I have spoken of. Today to conduct
scientific research is undoubtedly and essentially to work in company
with others, and this requires at least a minimum of good-will.
Research thus implies a disposition that moves in the spirit of peace,
and is on the threshold of love.
Assuredly, we have all to avoid closing our eyes to certain
disturbing realities: I think, for example, of the practical experiments
conducted by a great many Nazi doctors on living prisoners. And it is
unfortunately not impossible to imagine other doctors, in another
country, yielding to the temptation to make use of human
merchandise that other tyrants may place at their disposal. What is,
alas, clear, is that to be a researcher, far from excluding sinister
possibilities, helps to favor them. We could, in truth, reassure
ourselves by noting that in the world taday at least, there exists a
[certain] consensus of opinion among scientists which forbids such
observations. But, I repeat, this is in the world today. We do not know
what is going to happen tomorrow. The growth of population may
lead to a debasement of human existence so radical, and human life
may be so depreciated, [so cheapened], that it will corne to be
thought superfluous to surround it with the precautions and the
respect that it enjoys today and indeed such respect and such
precautions may even appear contrary to the common sense of the
future.
We have stumbled here on another problem which illustrates
very weil that embarrassment which is feit by the man of today who
questions himself about the relations betwesn science and wisdom:
and this is simply the problem of over-population. In the face of ever
increasing difficulties which are likely to emerge with an unlimited
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increase in the population of the globe, we may ask whether the
scientist, as a scientist, has the competence to give to men advice
that looks Iike wisdom; and in a case like this, does not the distinction
between science and wisdom run the risk of being obliterated: At first
sight, that looks unlikely. Clearly, Science must concern itself with the
problem, and seek to solve it in the sphere which is its own, that is to
say, of striving to find the means of nourishing this excessive
population. But does Science not trespass beyond its right in
venturing into the sphere of private life? Would not the scientist be
arrogating a function which is not his own? Here, once again, we must
be more specific. In this world of ours - and here I speak of us
Westerners • it will surely not be allowed that the right, which belongs
to a couple to decide the question of procreation, should be
restricted from outside in the light of conclusions reached through
research controlled by [perhaps] an international organisation? And
what about the question of keeping alive old people whose social
usefulness has fallen to zero? It is perfectly conceivable, and, to my
mind, very plausible, that if the process of secularisation which is
already going on so fast in the world, goes on even faster, then the
barriers which still hold today may be overthrown. It is necessary to
add that what I am talking about here is technocratic development as
such, [either] in an Americanized world or a Soviet world.
But the question that must exercise our minds remains always
the same: namely,· the question of whether Science itself is to be put
in the dock. The answer must, I feel, be full of nuances. We come
back to what I have said already. Cerlainly, Science, with that power
not only over Nature but also over Man himself, which it has given to
humanity, has clearly helped to lead men into temptation; and one can
hardly believe that it has helped to develop in peoplels minds the
means and the inne~ resources needed to resist that temptation; tor
there is no hiding the fact that what I have said about the humility of
the true scientist does not apply to what one might call, as a mass, the
science-mongers, that is to say, the innumerable multitude of those
who, at various levels, benefit from the work of scientists, and transmit
it to others. In any case, on this plane nothing, absolutely nothing, is
guaranteed. I have often said in the past that scientific techniques are
likely to be dangerous from the moment that they are no Ionger put at
the service of ends higher than the technical • and science, I fear,
without denying those ends, ignores thema More precisely,
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techniques are in danger of being used - as we can see more and
more in Western countries on both sides of the Atlantic - in danger of
being used for ends which occupy a decidedly inferior place in 'the
hierarchy of values established by the sages of the past. Obviously,
we are faced here with a tangle of problems. For it can always be
claimed that the traditional hierarchy is meaningless, or is only
possible in an aristocratic system incompatible with the world we see
before us today, which is the world of the masses. However, that
rejoinder is itself open to criticism; for if we take it literally we see that it
entails a sort of acquiesence in the degradation of the human race.
Everything depends on what you mean by "aristocraticll • Can we
honestly be satisfied with a levelling that is just a levelling-down? Can
we dispute the creation, from among the masses themselves, of new
aristocracies - though admittedly not those based on blood or wealth?
However that may be, it seems to me impossible to uphold for
an instant the notion that science - I deplore having to use this
excessively general and abstract word - that science could in any way
furnish a justification for that sort of radical egalitarianism that
Nietzsche and Scheler demonstrated to be rooted, primarily,in
resentment.
We have come perilously far from our central theme, and the
subject of this lecture. So perhaps I ought to wind .uP by saying more
explicitly what has emerged in the course of this rambling pilgrimage.
In the first place, I argued that we ought to maintain a radical
distinction between wisdom and that kind of generalized hygiene to
which technically-minded people try to reduce it. For my own part, I
think it is a matter of re-discovering the common root of propriety and
justice. To use a musical idiom, as I often do, I should say that justice
is, above all, a steady reference to a certain keynote which we find as
much in the case of Marcus Aurelius as in that of Socrates, or Goethe,
or 5pinoza. This keynote cannot perhaps be defined without losing
its value: I would say it is an essence, though not an essence - in the
sense of an objectifiable content, but rather a crystalisation of the
Light, about which I have said elsewhere that it is at the same time, Joy
in being Light. [And, of course, this is purely Johannic.] But this
takes us towards a centre around which we have ceased to gravitate -
for the pure joy of the scientist, whose work develops weil, is nothing
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but an expression of that same joy: perhaps indeed we should regard
the gaudium cognoscendi as an anticipation of that Laetitia
Contemplandi which is the supreme end of our lifels journey on earth.
I venture to say that there is not, and cannot be, latonall
wisdom. In life atonality· is confusion and frenzy, while wisdom, in 'lhe
last analysis, is perhaps a joyous elfort to clarify and master life, just as
science, on its side, is a victory over 'the fantasies of ignorance and
fear.
It is thus, perhaps, that we reach, in the terms of our inquiry, a
sort of convergence.
There is wisdom wherever a man seeks, I do not say to
organize, but to order his life around a centre which makes the mere
concern to sustain onels existence and interests appear peripheral
and subordinate.
But Science itself is reduced to a seattered heap of knowledge
if it is not constituted around a centre. One need only add here that
this eentre remains mueh more veiled than it does at the level of
personalIife, and this is perhaps the eause of the diffieulties we meet.
I will say in passing that to speak of truth in a eertain voiee is probably
to betray the very spirit of science, which is research. Naturally I must
add that one does not engage in research for the pleasure of
research. Perhaps one ought to say that one tries to make the
universe as mueh as possible inward: but b~ware lest assimilating the
universe inwardly should turn out to mean possessing it, to do with it
what you please. For in 'this there is always a risk of an aberration; and
thus of the essential and pure intention of the scientist being
dangerously corrupted. To assimilate inwardly - I believe that this must
be understood in a very different sense; in the sense, for example,
that we seek to assimilate inwardly a poem or a piece of musie. This
does not mean being able to play the music or write the poem. It is
rather a matter of aehieving a eertain eonsonance with the world; not
by means that belong to the imagination, but by a method that has, on
the eontrary, its own rigar.
Now, how come it is scientists appear rather seldom to be
themselves aware of this end? Can it be that their minds are so
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eoneentrated on means whieh they never eease to perfeet and
sharpen that they lose all possibility of apprehending an end whieh
eannot be expressed in the language of those means? Part of the
duty of the philosopher consists perhaps in opening the mind of the
scientist to this understanding; to make him hear that fundamental
sound, or tone, of which I have spoken; and so to bring about a
mediation between seienee and that wisdom whieh, notwithstanding
its detractors, remains present and aetive, I am sure, in those lives
whieh seem to us alien to the world of the mind only beeause we have
the tiresome habit of judging them aeeording to the singularly stunted
modes of fashionable literature and philosophy. I am absolutely
eonvineed that it is just this sort of sereen that we must break through
if we are to get eloser to those seeret regions where seienee and
wisdom, without beeoming identieal, [altogether] eonverge.
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